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#2A-1/29/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 832, NIAGARA COUNTY WHITE COLLAR UNIT, 
---— ---••- —•—.-.-- Chargring^Party-, -—-^  — -----
-and- CASE NO. U-10735 
COUNTY OF NIAGARA, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL G. ORTIZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
GLENN S. HACKETT, ESQ., NIAGARA COUNTY ATTORNEY 
(VINCENT R. GINESTRE, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us1 on the exceptions of CSEA, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 83 2, Niagara County White 
Collar Unit (CSEA) to the dismissal of its improper practice 
charge against the County of Niagara (County). The charge 
alleges that the County violated §209-i-a.l (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on February 17, 
1989, it refused to negotiate further with CSEA unless CSEA 
agreed to a four percent package and withdrew its agreement 
to all items tentatively agreed upon, and when it designated 
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a chief negotiator without affording him sufficient authority 
to negotiate and enter into an agreement. 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissed 
the charge after hearing, finding that the parties had agreed 
—to—package—bai?ga-i-n^g-,—wh-ich^^ ..—.-.— 
parties to withdraw items previously agreed upon at any time 
prior to agreement on all issues. The ALT further found that 
CSEA was aware of and acquiesced in the negotiating process 
in which the County negotiator engaged, of regularly 
consulting with the County Legislature's Personnel Committee 
and obtaining that Committee's approval prior to agreement on 
any issues of substance. Based upon these findings, the ALT 
concluded that no violation of the Act had occurred and 
accordingly dismissed the charge. 
It is indubitably true that if, as CSEA alleges, the 
County took a position at the parties' negotiating session on 
February 17, 1989 that it would not negotiate further unless 
CSEA first agreed to accept a four percent total economic 
package, a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act would be 
found.i/ Although the ALT decision does not specifically 
address this issue, we find that the charge alleges a 
i/see Addison Teachers Ass'n, 19 PERB «|[3062 (1986) ; CSD 
of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB [^3060 (1971) . 
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violation in this regard,2-/ and that the parties litigated 
the issue at the hearing. Indeed, the ALT decision 
specifically describes the testimony of Mary K. Saxon, a 
member of CSEA's negotiating team and its recording 
—secretary-,—who^test:i-fied=ithat^Ronaid^KolpacJc^^^the^Eersoniiel^^ 
Director for the County and its chief negotiator, told the 
CSEA negotiating committee, on February 17, 198 9, that unless 
they were willing to accept a four percent total package, 
there were no other proposals which would be discussed. The 
AKJ further described Saxon's testimony as follows: 
[w]hen asked if they could discuss noneconomic 
items, Kolpack responded that, when he presented 
the same question to the Personnel Committee [of 
the County Legislature], they asked him: "Are you 
deaf? We said four percent total. Nothing else is 
to be discussed unless there is agreement on the 
four percent total." County of Niagara, 2 2 PERB 
54578, at 4708 (1989). 
Saxon's testimony is corroborated to a significant degree by 
Kolpack, who testified as follows: 
Q. The County was willing to talk about something 
if they [CSEA] agreed to the four percent? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. So if the union would have agreed to four 
percent you would have been willing to talk about 
the other noneconomic items? 
A. Yes. 
-^/The charge alleges, in pertinent part, that "the County 
negotiator withdrew all previous tentative agreements entered 
by the parties, told this union they are offering a four 
percent raise period and nothing else. The County negotiator 
then refused to negotiate any further." 
Board - U-10735 -4 
In view of the essentially uncontroverted testimony 
that, on February 17, 1989, the County took the position that 
unless CSEA agreed to a four percent package, the County 
would not negotiate further on any other issues, the ALJ was 
in error in failing to make a finding of a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act in this regard. We accordingly 
reverse so much of the ALJ decision and recommended order as 
dismisses this aspect of the charge and find that the County 
violated the Act when it refused to engage in further 
negotiations until and unless CSEA agreed to a four percent 
economic package. 
The second issue litigated by the parties before the AKJ 
relates to whether the withdrawal by the County of previously 
tentatively agreed upon items at the February 17, 1989 
negotiating session violates the duty to negotiate in good 
faith. There is no dispute between the parties that, as part 
of their ground rules, they had agreed to engage in package 
bargaining, whereby no agreement reached as to any individual 
item becomes final until the parties reach agreement on all 
items. Consistent with our holding in Yonkers Federation of 
Teachers, Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO. 8 PERB [^3020 (1975), the 
ALJ found that a party does not engage in an improper 
practice when it refuses to treat as final its agreement on 
individual items until there is agreement as to the whole. 
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We accordingly affirm so much of the ALT decision as 
dismisses this aspect of CSEA's improper practice charge. 
1/ 
The third element of the improper practice charge filed 
by CSEA is that the County failed to negotiate in good faith 
— - - whe^—i-t—f ad=ied—to—vest^ 
authority to enter into agreements, as required by its good 
faith bargaining obligation.-^/ 
The ALJ's dismissal of this aspect of the charge rests 
upon the ground that CSEA acquiesced in the negotiating 
procedure utilized by the County after it became aware of the 
procedure, by participating in it and failing to object to 
it. In our view, however, whether CSEA acquiesced in the 
) negotiating procedure utilized by the County need only be 
reached if a finding has been made that CSEA has met its 
burden of proving that Kolpack lacked authority to engage in 
good faith negotiations and enter into tentative agreements. 
If this burden of proof has not been met, it is unnecessary 
for us to decide whether the County's defense of acquiescence 
is meritorious. 
2-/See also Draper Teachers Ass'n, 18 PERB [^3027 (1985) , 
wherein the Board found that withdrawal of a previous salary 
demand and substitution of an increased salary demand by an 
employee organization prior to impasse was not an improper 
practice in the absence of evidence that the new demand was 
part of a design to frustrate the negotiations process. 
•Vsee Vestal Teachers Ass'n, 3 PERB «p057 (1970) . 
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There is no doubt that the County's chief negotiator was 
under clear and explicit instructions from the Legislature's 
Personnel Committee to confer with it on a frequent and 
regular basis, and that the Personnel Committee provided to 
—tfae^ chief—^ nego-tiaitor-^ s-tric't^ gaiideliiies^ within—whdich- ~ ~ -
negotiations could take place. The issue before us is 
whether this requirement to obtain advance approval of 
bargaining positions before reaching tentative agreements 
with CSEA and of affording extremely limited flexibility in 
negotiating issues at the bargaining table establishes a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
This Board recognizes that it is usual and customary for 
a chief negotiator to engage in frequent consultation with 
his or her principals, and that such consultation may be 
necessary in the negotiation of an agreement if it is to be 
favorably considered and ratified by the principals. A 
violation of the Act will be found only where the charging 
party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a 
respondent has failed to vest in its chief negotiator 
sufficient authority to negotiate meaningfully by utilizing 
the negotiator merely to communicate bargaining positions 
taken by the principal away from the bargaining table.-^/ The 
Act clearly contemplates that chief executive officers of 
public employers will appear themselves, or by designees 
^/see Sachem CSD No. 5f 6 PERB ^3014, at 3035 (1973). 
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vested with their authority, at the bargaining table for the 
purpose of engaging in meaningful give and take and reaching 
agreements concerning terms and conditions of employment. 6/ 
Although Kolpack's authority to negotiate was, without 
- - - doubt-^extxemely^i-i:^^^^ — 
meet its burden of proving that he lacked the authority to 
enter into agreements. Indeed, CSEA concedes that tentative 
agreements were reached during the course of the 15 
negotiation sessions conducted between the parties, and that, 
at least as to some issues, the County's chief negotiator 
entered into tentative agreements at the table, without delay 
for consultation with the Personnel Committee. Additional 
7 issues were agreed upon after consultation took place. In 
the absence of specific evidence of a negotiator's failure to 
engage in meaningful negotiation of bargaining issues, we 
will not find a violation where, as here, the evidence does 
establish that the parties entered into tentative agreements 
£/§201.12 of the Act provides that 
[t]he term "agreement" means the result 
of the exchange of mutual promises 
between the chief executive officer of a 
public employer and an employee 
organization which becomes a binding 
contract, for the period set forth 
therein, except as to any provisions 
therein which require approval by a 
legislative body, and as to those 
provisions, shall become binding when the 
appropriate legislative body gives its 
approval. 
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on specific items. Furthermore, as pointed out by the ALT, 
this record presents us with no evidence that the County 
engaged in a deliberate design to purposely frustrate the 
negotiating process by precluding its chief negotiator from 
-e^ter4ng^i-nto—ag-reemettts^on—items—at—the—ta£le.^-~ The—record 
is void of evidence that those delays in reaching tentative 
agreements occasioned by Kolpack's frequent consultation with 
the Personnel Committee were so unreasonable as to give rise 
to an inference of a deliberate design to avoid meaningful 
negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that the County's 
procedure was at least awkward and time-consuming. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the County failed 
to negotiate in good faith in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act when it refused to negotiate further unless and until 
CSEA accepted a four percent economic package, and the charge 
is dismissed in all other respects. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA with respect 
to terms and conditions of employment of unit employees; 
and 
) ^/see CSEA, Inc. (County of Wayne), 14 PERB ^3092 (1981). 
I 
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2. Sign and post notice in the form attached at 
all locations used for written communications to members 
of the bargaining unit represented by CSEA. 
-DATE D :^^t£anuary—29^=^9-9 0-
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member y 
\ 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
_PUBU€_EMELO^MEISJT_BELATJOMS^BQARa 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by CSEA, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 832, Niagara County VThite 
Collar Unit, that the County of Niagara: 
1. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment 
of unit employees. 
County of N i a g a r a 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I ) 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10438 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ, 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The United University Professions (UUP) has filed 
exceptions before this Board to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) decision which found it to have violated §2 09-a.2(a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to 
conduct a reasonably prompt hearing upon the appeal of 
Thomas C. Barry, charging party, from UUP's determination of 
the advance reduction of Barry's agency shop fee deduction 
for the fiscal year 1988-89. 
In particular, the charge alleges, and the ALJ found, 
that Barry was informed by letter dated July 22, 1988 of the 
amount of the advance reduction in his agency shop fees for 
fiscal year 1988-89, intended to reflect the proportion of 
Board - U-10438 
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anticipated 1988-89 expenditures exempted from involuntary 
payment as part of agency fees by the Act.i/ 
Pursuant to Barry's objection to the use of any of his 
fees for political or ideological purposes, and to the amount 
determined by UUP to constitute the pro rata share of such 
expenditures, Barry notified UUP's president by letter dated 
August 1, 1988 of his objection and requested a hearing. 
On May 3, 1989, Barry was notified by the American 
Arbitration Association, which had been selected by UUP to 
conduct hearings upon objections to advance reductions and/or 
refunds of pro rata shares of agency fees, that a 
consolidated hearing on "the UUP fiscal year 1987-88 Final 
Agency Fee Refund Determination and the 1988-89 Advanced 
Reduction of Agency Fee" would be held before a designated 
arbitrator on June 13, 1989. Barry's contention is that the 
June 13, 1989 hearing date, more than nine months following 
the filing of his objection to the amount of the advance 
i/Section 208.3(a) of the Act entitles the employee 
organization representing members of the Professional 
Services Unit in the State University to "have deducted 
from the wage or salary of the employees in such 
negotiating unit who are not members of said employee 
organization the amount equivalent to the dues levied by 
such employee organization . . . . Provided, however, that 
the foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall only be 
applicable in the case of an employee organization which 
has established and maintained a procedure providing for 
the refund to any employee demanding the return of any part 
of an agency shop fee deduction which represents the 
employee's pro rata share of expenditures by the 
organization in aid of activities or causes of a political 
or ideological nature only incidentally related to terms 
and conditions of employment." 
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reduction established by UUP, is violative of the Act because 
it fails to afford him a "reasonably prompt" review of the 
amount of the advance reduction by a neutral decision maker. 
At the outset, UUP excepts to the ALJ's determination 
that a hearing upon the advance reduction determination is 
required by the Act, in light of the payment of the advance 
reduction plus a ten percent cushion prior to the 
commencement of the fiscal year at issue. However, the 
Board's requirement of a hearing upon the advance reduction, 
even where a ten percent cushion is provided, was upheld in 
UUP v. Newman, 146 A.D.2d 273, 22 PERB 57012 (1989) (remanded 
upon other grounds), motion for leave to appeal denied, 74 
N.Y.2d 614, 22 PERB [^7033 (October 26, 1989). This Board's 
order directing UUP to include in its agency fee refund 
procedure a hearing upon advance reduction determinations has 
accordingly been affirmed, and is not subject to collateral 
attack; nor do we choose to review it further at this time. 
UUP's exceptions also allege that Barry lacks standing 
to file the instant charge because he has not specifically 
alleged his membership in a unit represented by UUP and 
because he failed to state the specific areas of his 
( objection to the computation of the advance reduction by UUP 
in his appeal of the amount. The first exception is denied 
because, as the ALJ found, Barry acknowledges a duty to pay 
agency fees to UUP, from which unit membership is 
) appropriately inferred. The second exception is denied 
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because it is not an issue appropriate for our determination 
but is for the arbitrator to decide, particularly in light of 
UUP's failure to assert the alleged deficiency as a bar to 
arbitration. 
UUP does not appear to claim in its defense that a 
June 13, 1989 review of its July 22, 1988 advance reduction 
determination is reasonably prompt. Rather, its defense 
rests upon the assertion that this Board approved of such a 
delay when it approved, in the context of another case (UUP 
(Barry, Eson, Gallup) , 20 PERB [^3052 (1987)), the agency fee 
refund procedure for the 1988-89 fiscal year. UUP concedes 
that it is obligated under the approved procedure to present 
appeals concerning the appropriateness of the advance 
reduction "for expeditious hearing and resolution", through 
the offices of the American Arbitration Association. 
Notwithstanding this language, UUP alleges that its action 
herein is authorized by the following statement in UUP 
(Barry, Eson, Gallup), at 3115, which is also contained in 
its refund procedure: "Nothing shall preclude the union from 
including appeals from the amount of the advance reductions 
in the same proceeding with appeals from the final 
determination of refund. The neutral, however, will be 
required to make independent findings on each issue." 
UUP asserts that by giving sanction to the possibility 
of consolidated appeals of advance reductions and final 
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determinations of refund, this Board, in essence, sanctioned 
lengthy delays in the conduct of advance reduction 
determination hearings. This is simply not the case. In 
fact, consolidated review was approved by this Board only and 
exclusively to the extent that the other requirements of the 
agency fee refund procedure and this Board's decision in UUP 
(Barry, Gallup, Eson) , 20 PERB }[3039 (1987) , could be met. 
The ALJ correctly concluded that this Board's previous 
holdings require, first and foremost, that review of UUP's 
advance reduction determinations and final refund 
determinations must be prompt and impartial, and that the 
convenience of consolidating hearings could be accommodated 
only if the requirement of promptness can be met.-2-/ 
It is our determination that a ten-month delay in the 
conduct of a hearing to determine the appropriateness of an 
advance reduction determination is not reasonably prompt and 
is accordingly violative of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that UUP: 
1. Refund to Barry the total amount of agency fees 
deducted from his salary for the 1988-89 fiscal 
year, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
^/See UUP (Barry), 22 PERB ^3003 (1989). 
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2. Conduct its hearings on appeals from the amount or 
appropriateness of its advance reduction in agency 
shop fees in a reasonably prompt and expeditious 
manner. 
3/ 
DATED: January 29, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member* 
1/ 
In view of the individualized nature of the violation 
found, a posting is not appropriate. 
#2C-1/29/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MORRIS E. ESON, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
MORRIS E. ESON, pro se 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The United University Professions (UUP) excepts to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision which found it to 
have violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by failing to conduct an expeditious 
hearing on the objection of Morris E. Eson, charging party, 
to its determination of the amount of the advance reduction 
in his agency fees for 1988-89. 
The facts may be briefly stated as follows. Eson 
received, on July 22, 1988, an advance reduction of his 
1988-89 agency fee. By letter dated July 29, 1988, Eson 
promptly filed objections, pursuant to UUP's agency fee 
rebate procedures for the 1988-89 fiscal year, to the amount 
of the advance reduction and the method of determining the 
amount. Thereafter, Eson received no communication 
CASE NO. U-10439 
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concerning his objection to the amount of the advance 
reduction until May 3, 1989, when he received a letter from 
the American Arbitration Association informing him of the 
identity of the arbitrator assigned to hear his appeal from 
the 1988-89 advance reduction determination, and scheduling 
the hearing for June 13, 1989. 
In a decision issued this date (UUP (Barry), 2 3 PERB 
}[3001) , this Board holds, on substantially identical facts, 
that UUP has violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by failing to 
conduct a hearing on the objections to the amount of the 
advance reduction until ten months after the advance 
reduction determination was made and communicated and 
objections filed thereto. The delay in conducting such 
hearing, we find, is not excused by this Board's approval of 
UUP's agency fee refund procedure, which permits it to 
consolidate hearings on advance reductions and final 
determinations of refund. As we hold in UUP (Barry), decided 
today, such consolidation was permitted and authorized only 
to the extent that it could be accomplished consistent with 
the requirement that hearings be conducted in a reasonably 
expeditious manner. 
Based upon the reasoning set forth in our decision in 
UUP (Barry), decided herewith, the ALJ decision is affirmed. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that UUP: 
1. Refund to Eson the total amount of agency fees 
deducted from his salary for the 1988-89 fiscal 
year, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
2. Conduct its hearings on appeals from the amount or 
appropriateness of its advance reduction in agency 
shop fees in a reasonably prompt and expeditious 
manner.i/ 
DATED: January 29, 1990 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member £ 
In view of the individualized nature of the violation 
found, a posting is not appropriate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA, 
Charging Party, 
-and CASE^Na.^0-lX32:&6 
LOCAL 1170 of the COMMUNICATION 
WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
BUYCK, SPRINGER, FITZSIMMONS, FITZPATRICK, DESMARTEAU 
and STANDER, ESQS. (THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SCHULLER & JAMES, ESQS. 
(RICHARD D. FURLONG, ESQ. and RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 117 0 
of the Communication Workers of America (CWA) to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision and recommended order 
finding it to have violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to execute an 
agreement upon request of the Town of Henrietta (Town). The 
agreement at issue relates to the settlement of disciplinary 
charges brought against a bargaining unit member by the Town 
following submission of the disciplinary grievance contesting 
the charges to arbitration, but prior to issuance of an 
arbitration award. 
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The facts in this case are set forth in detail in the 
ALT decision (22 PERB [^4559 (1989)), and will be briefly 
summarized here only as necessary to place our analysis in 
appropriate context. 
— -Fo3.-l-owJ.ng—the^ conclusion—of—test:imony^ aitx4;he^ airbl4:r-at-i-on^ ^ 
hearing on the disciplinary charges of a bargaining unit 
member (grievant), the representatives of the CWA and the 
Town agreed to engage in settlement discussions, with the 
approval of the designated arbitrator, who apparently agreed 
to withhold issuance of any award pending the outcome of the 
settlement discussions. Counsel for the parties conferred on 
a number of occasions and ultimately reached oral agreement 
) concerning the resolution of the disciplinary matter, the 
terms of which included resignation of the grievant with 
backpay. The parties also agreed that they would reduce 
their agreement to writing, and that it would be executed by 
the Town Supervisor, counsel for the CWA, and the grievant. 
A draft settlement agreement was prepared by counsel for the 
CWA and forwarded to the Town counsel, who made changes in 
it, including the addition of a provision for ratification of 
the agreement by the Town Board-^/ and detailed general 
release language applicable to the grievant, which he 
i/The settlement agreement drafted by the Town counsel 
provides: "This agreement is subject to ratification by the 
Henrietta Town Board, and the Town Supervisor agrees to 
recommend ratification and make a good faith effort to secure 
i ratification by the Town Board." Cf. §204-a of the Act. 
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reviewed by telephone with counsel for the CWA. The language 
was orally agreed upon and the Town counsel forwarded the 
final draft of the settlement agreement to the Town 
Supervisor for his signature immediately thereafter, on June 
- 2-3-,—19-88-. Qii^ Jzurtei^ 2-7-7-^ t-he^  -
agreement and forwarded it by mail to the CWA attorney, who 
received it on June 29. In the interim, on June 28, the CWA 
attorney contacted the Town attorney by telephone and 
informed him that CWA and the grievant were no longer willing 
to sign the agreement previously orally reached, because it 
had not been signed and delivered by June 24 and because the 
grievant could not accept its terms. 
.) Thereafter, the CWA requested that the arbitrator issue 
his award, based upon the failure of the parties to reach a 
settlement agreement, and an award was issued on August 29, 
1988, which was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court, 
Monroe County by decision dated April 6, 1989.•2-/—/ 
The Town asserts in its charge that the CWA failed to 
•2/The Supreme Court decision was issued after the close 
of the hearing but before the AKJ decision issued. It was 
forwarded to the AKJ by counsel for the CWA with notice to 
the counsel for the Town. No objection to the consideration 
of the decision was received and, in any event, the decision 
of the Supreme Court is an appropriate matter for the taking 
of administrative notice. 
•^ ./The Town cross-moved to vacate the award based upon the 
unsigned written settlement agreement. Notwithstanding the 
Town's settlement claim, the cross-motion to vacate the award 
was denied and the award was confirmed. 
f 
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negotiate in good faith when it entered into an agreement but 
refused to execute it, as assertedly required by §2 04.3 of 
the Act.4/ 
At the outset we find that, nothwithstanding the CWA's 
— axgument^thafc^^—condi^^ -
acceptance by the Town on or before June 24, the AKJ 
evidentiary finding to the contrary should be and is 
affirmed. The ALJ properly found, on the record before her, 
that an oral agreement (including offer, acceptance, and 
consideration) was reached. The question remaining to be 
decided is whether a Taylor Law duty exists to execute the 
disciplinary settlement agreement reached. 
) The CWA also asserts that the Town seeks nothing more 
than enforcement of an agreement reached under the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement, which is not subject to our 
1/s ection 2 04.3 of the Act provides as follows: 
For the purpose of this article, to 
negotiate collectively is the performance 
of the mutual obligation of the public 
employer and a recognized or certified 
employee organization to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party, but such 
obligation does not compel either party 
to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
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jurisdiction pursuant to the limitations contained in 
§205.5 (d) of the Act.-5-/ In a narrow sense, the CWA's 
argument is correct in that an oral agreement was reached, 
and the oral agreement included among its terms that it would 
- be—reduced—to—writing— and—executed—^ b^y-^ the^ T-0-wn-,^ t^he^ -CWA-,^ a^3id^ ^ 
the grievant. Thus, the instant charge seeks enforcement of 
that "execution" term of the oral agreement. This analysis 
is dispositive of the charge unless the failure to execute a 
written agreement confirming the terms of the oral agreement 
otherwise constitutes an improper employee organization 
practice. 
The ALJ found that the failure to execute the 
) agreement submitted to the CWA constitutes a separate 
violation of the Act, citing our decision in Deer Park 
Teachers Association, 13 PERB [^3048 (1980) . In that case, we 
held that §2 04.3 of the Act requires a party to a collective 
bargaining agreement to execute a single contract document, 
upon the request of the other party, even if it has already 
signed and ratified a memorandum of agreement. 
ection 2 05.5(d) of the Act provides, in pertinent 
part: 
[T]he board shall not have authority to 
enforce an agreement between an employer 
and an employee organization and shall 
not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would 
not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization 
) practice. 
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The question before us, however, is whether an agreement 
to settle a disciplinary grievance is required by the Act to 
be treated in the same fashion as a collective bargaining 
agreement with respect to its execution. Central to a 
-determination—of—this—question—is^a^rev-iew^ 
of §2 04.3 of the Act, which is directed primarily toward the 
duty to negotiate collectively. If the full panoply of 
collective negotiations procedures contemplated by the Act 
were to apply to the settlement of grievances under contract 
interpretation or disciplinary grievance procedures, it would 
logically follow that impasse procedures, such as mediation 
and fact-finding, would arguably be applicable to the 
resolution of such a matter, and that the language of 
§204-a.l as well as legislative approval-^/ would be 
required.-^/ We believe that these results were not intended 
by the Act. The duty to execute a written agreement, created 
6/ 
Section 201.12 of the Act provides: 
The term "agreement" means the result of 
the exchange of mutual promises between 
the chief executive officer of a public 
employer and an employee organization 
which becomes a binding contract, for the 
period set forth therein, except as to 
any provisions therein which require 
approval by a legislative body, and as to 
those provisions, shall become binding 
when the appropriate legislatibve body 
gives its approval. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Town did not request 
inclusion of the language of §204-a.l of the Act in the 
settlement agreement. 
Board - U-10286 
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by §204.3, is most appropriately construed as applying to 
collectively negotiated agreements and not to settlement 
agreements reached pursuant to the grievance procedure 
contained in such a collectively negotiated agreement. 
—WhJL-1-e^ we^ do—not—co:nst-rue^ §^ 0:4-.-3^ -to—requiriei^ tha^ t-
settlement agreements must be reduced to writing and executed 
upon the request of either party, execution is without doubt 
the universal practice in order to clearly delineate the 
terms of the settlement and to provide for its enforcement. 
The fact that this practice exists and is much to be 
encouraged, does not, however, flow from §2 04.3 of the Act. 
Our finding in this regard is not intended to foreclose 
the possibility of a finding that a §209-a violation has 
otherwise occurred^/, even in the context of grievance 
settlement discussions. On this record, the intent required 
to support such a finding was not offered or established and 
no exception has been taken to the AKJ's dismissal of the 
§209-a.2(a) allegation. 
It is not for us to decide whether the oral agreement 
reached by the representatives of the parties is itself 
enforceable or whether CWA's refusal to execute an agreement, 
orally reached, is actionable. These are matters for 
determination in another forum. The sole issue before us is 
£/see Addison CSD, 17 PERB [^3076 (1984) . See also County of 
Niagara, 23 PERB [^3003 (January 29, 1990), citing CSEA, Inc. 
(County of Wayne) , 14 PERB [^3092 (1981) . 
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whether the Act requires a party which has entered into an 
oral settlement agreement of a disciplinary grievance to 
thereafter execute a written agreement and whether the 
failure to do so constitutes a violation of the duty to 
-negotiate in—gond^ fai±-tti- We -f-i nd^tkat-jit^doeS-Jiot;.- -Whether_ 
such a refusal constitutes a breach of the oral agreement 
itself, which may have included an agreement to reduce the 
oral agreement to writing and execute it, is not properly 
within our jurisdiction pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. 9/ 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 29, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
•^ -/in view of our finding, it is not necessary for us to 
reach the CWA's remaining exceptions. 
#3A-1/29/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 693, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3571 
TOWN OF HAMDEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 
693, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3571 
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Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operator, Heavy Equipment 
Operator, Laborer, and Mechanic. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 
693, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1990 
Albany, New York 
^-^JRX^ZJZ. *P A^T; 'JLAA 3—*VICL_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IAM*^- I-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe' 
#3B-1/29/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CICERO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- -and— — — — -" ' -"" " ^—GASE^NO^G-3 573 
TOWN OF CICERO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Cicero Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full- and part-time Patrolmen and 
Sergeants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and Civilian Dispatchers. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Cicero Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
-— good^xa^th—w^ 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1990 
) Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3C-1/29/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
Petitioner, 
-and- — CASE^NO.^C-^359^)^ 
TOWN OF MINDEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Full-time heavy equipment operator and machine 
operator. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. ^ Newman", Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
